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ABSTRACT 
Despite extensive research efforts, the causal link between various corporate governance 
practices and the long-term performance and survival of organizations is still largely 
unexplored. Various theoretical approaches aim at explaining a governance system’s influence 
on organizational performance and sustainability over the long run, but few contemporaneous 
corporate organizations have experienced long enough lifespans to examine the underliyng 
assumtions consistently in a sound and consistent empirical setting. Catholic orders are among 
the oldest still existing organizations and hence present a unique opportunity to test theoretical 
assumptions about governance systems’ capacity to influence long-term survival. This paper 
presents a structured inventory of the current state of research on the form and functions of the 
governance systems of three old Catholic orders (namely the Benedictines, Dominicans, and 
Jesuits) in historical perspective and confirms the relevance of this kind of approach.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, organizational performance, sustainability, history, 
Catholic orders, Benedictines, Dominicans, Jesuits. 
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Corporate governance has been a topic of public debate for at least two decades. This debate 
has arisen chiefly in response to serious financial crises and scandals and has triggered a 
number of reform efforts. Their explicit purpose is usually to ensure long-term survival and 
thus safeguard the interests of diverse stakeholders. The relationship between the various 
governance mechanisms and the long-term performance of a company is theoretically 
complex and as yet far from clear. In business administration, corporate governance has 
developed into an independent research field since the mid-1990s. A keyword search for the 
topic on the Scopus database shows an exponential increase in academic publications on the 
topic in the first decade of this century. 
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FIGURE 1 
Academic publications on the subject of corporate governance. Source: Scopus (title of 
graph: "Documents per year"; search: 14.6.2018; keyword: "corporate governance"; filter: 
"articles and reviews") 
 
Despite these extensive research efforts, the causal link between various governance practices 
and long-term performance and survival is still largely unexplored. There are several 
theoretical and methodological reasons for this. 
A company's corporate governance can most broadly be defined as a system consisting of all 
the mechanisms that determine the room for manoeuvre of its management, in particular the 
CEO, and thus influence the making of strategic decisions (Charrreaux, 1997; Wirtz, 2017). 
These include organizational mechanisms such as the supervisory board, the board of 
directors, and the shareholders' meeting; formal legal mechanisms such as company law, 
company constitutions and contracts; and informal mechanisms such as the corporate and 
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management culture. A methodological limitation of many studies on the performance of 
corporate governance is their focus on one mechanism at a time and neglect of possible 
effects of the governance system as a whole. The results of studies of this kind, mostly 
quantitative, are contradictory and often fail to reach significance (Bhagat & Black, 1999). 
Serious empirical investigation of systemic interaction effects between governance 
mechanisms and their influence on performance and survival requires access to massive, 
often qualitative, data on organizational decision-making processes. In-depth procedural case 
studies are helpful in this context, but these are so far rare in the field of corporate 
governance, which is strongly oriented towards finance. Furthermore, the data available for 
contemporary companies rarely extend over very long periods and are therefore of limited 
use for studying long-term survival.¨ 
 
One limitation of many studies on the efficiency and effectiveness of corporate governance 
lies in the usually very narrow monodisciplinary theoretical focus of the mainstream, which is 
strongly influenced by financial management (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003), and the 
codes of best practice derived from it (Wirtz, 2008). The mainstream often restricts the 
function of governance mechanisms to the reduction of conflicts of interest and their 
economic consequences, termed agency costs. However, more recent theoretical research 
approaches from a strategic management perspective argue that certain governance 
mechanisms under certain conditions also provide cognitive functions, which not only control 
corporate management in possible conflicts of interest but also support strategic decision-
making and implementation. 
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Catholic religious communities such as the Benedictines, Dominicans, and Jesuits are among 
the oldest extant organizations. These orders very early developed very different systems of 
governance to control and support their leaders – an abbot, a prior, and a superior general, 
respectively. The long survival of these organizations suggests that their specific systems of 
governance contributed to maintaining their organizational balance over long periods (Inauen 
et al., 2010). Each of these three orders originated in different historical periods, and the 
objectives of each were shaped by the social conditions of its epoch (early Middle Ages, High 
Middle Ages, early Modern period). Nevertheless, they all persist to this day, which suggests 
a certain organizational effectiveness, regardless of the specific circumstances of their 
origins. Examining the governance systems of these orders may thus indicate how various 
approaches to organizational theory can contribute to a better understanding of sustainable 
performance and survivability. This chapter outlines the specifics of these orders’ governance 
and examines how particular theoretical approaches taken in recent governance research, in 
particular agency theory, knowledge based theory, and behavioral economics, can contribute 
to understanding sustainable organizational functioning. One aim of this article is thus to 
enrich the current discussion on corporate governance by broadening its theoretical horizon 
and testing it empirically with historically successful organizations. This shows alternatives 
to the unified model of corporate governance propagated by the codes of best practice. 
 
1. Broadening the theoretical horizon of corporate governance 
Since the 1990s, corporate governance has attracted increasing public awareness. This is 
largely a consequence of financial scandals in listed companies (e.g., Enron, Worldcom) and 
of crises in entire economic systems (e.g., the Asian financial crisis, the subprime crisis). 
Two causes often cited in this context are the irresponsibility of corporate management, 
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which in many cases has clearly pursued its own personal interests, and the failure of control 
systems. Business management research, which seeks a better understanding of governance 
mechanisms and their impact on corporate performance, has therefore initially focused on 
controlling conflicts of interest. Much of the initial research focused on specific control 
mechanisms, especially the supervisory board. More recent research, however, increasingly 
views corporate governance as a complex system in which various mechanisms interact 
(Charreaux, 1997; Charreaux & Wirtz, 2006; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Wirtz, 2017). More 
recent theoretical approaches also indicate that some governance mechanisms may not only 
channel conflicts of interest but also assume strategically supportive functions such as 
consulting and the acquisition of competence, which in some cases have a considerable 
influence on performance and long-term endurance (Charreaux & Wirtz, 2006; Filatotchev & 
Wright, 2005). Here, we consider how to characterize a governance system and which 
functions it may assume. We then examine whether and how the various theoretical 
approaches of recent governance research are likely to contribute to an understanding of the 
long-term survival of such specific organizations as the Catholic Orders, which are, of course, 
very different from modern companies in many respects. 
 
1.1 What is a corporate governance system? 
A corporate governance system consists of various mechanisms that significantly influence 
the room for manoeuvre of corporate management. One of the most extensively researched of 
these is the board of directors (or supervisory board). A keyword search in the Scopus 
database on 19 July 2018 results in almost 20,000 articles on corporate governance and 
approximately 12,000 hits for the term board of directors. It is the corporate board that is the 
focus of most corporate governance codes, and these texts usually attach particular 
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importance to the independence of the board members. This illustrates the often very narrow 
focus of many studies on corporate governance. The board of directors is only one of many 
governance mechanisms. The owners' meeting, the financial market, the labour market for 
top executives, and many other mechanisms typically play an important role in the 
governance of large companies and in other types of organizations, which sometimes have no 
supervisory board at all, such as medium-sized companies, non-profit associations, NGOs, 
and religious communities. These mechanisms all share at least one of two characteristics: 
Either they restrict the scope of action of the management by imposing some control on the 
CEO, thus avoiding possible conflicts of interest, or they may support the cognitive or 
network resources of the actors involved in governance. It would be pointless to draw up a 
comprehensive list of governance mechanisms as they form and develop over time, each of 
which depends on the specific socio-economic and historical conditions under which the 
organizations concerned operate. Nonetheless, various mechanisms can be categorized to 
gain a better understanding of their impact on organizational leadership. Charreaux (1997) 
proposes a typology based on two dimensions: the specificity of a governance mechanism to 
its organization and the intentionality or spontaneity of a mechanism's operation. The 
composition of a corporate board’s members is among the specific mechanisms of a 
company, just as the chapter of an abbey is among its specific mechanisms of governance. 
The corporate law of a country and its governance code, often referred to as the code of best 
practice, are among the non-specific mechanisms. These define the range of action of the 
management of all organizations falling within their scope, just as canon law is also 
authoritative for all orders and the Benedictine rule applies to the governance of all 
Benedictine abbeys. Another classification of governance mechanisms often found in the 
literature distinguishes between internal and external mechanisms. This raises the difficult 
question of the boundaries of an organization. For example, the board of directors is often 
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classified as internal. However, is this relevant in view of the common demand that a 
majority of the board members should be recruited from outside the company to avoid 
conflicts of interest? In any case, the actual composition of a corporate board is company 
specific. 
The second dimension of Charreaux's typology concerns the intentionality or spontaneity of a 
mechanism. Intentional mechanisms, such as the board and corporate law, deliberately pursue 
explicit goals. Conversely, spontaneous mechanisms such as corporate culture or the specific 
spirituality of an order, are not explicitly dictated but the result of complex social interactions 
and socialization processes, and these sometimes lead to results that are difficult or 
impossible to anticipate. The conscious manipulation of such mechanisms and their 
consequences is therefore very difficult, sometimes even impossible. However, these 
mechanisms are an integral part of social reality. 
The broad definition of governance as a system of mechanisms influencing the room for 
manoeuvre of organizational management and Charreaux’s typology are helpful because they 
can potentially be applied to very different types of organizations. This enables a structured 
appraisal of the concrete governance of a particular organization, as we have done, for 
example, for the governance of a Dominican province (Wirtz, 2017; see section 2.2., Fig. 3). 
The distinction between specific and non-specific mechanisms also allows socio-historical 
contextualization. Non-specific mechanisms play a decisive role here; for example, 
legislation differs greatly depending on time and space. Defining them as a system shows the 
dynamic and complex interaction of the various mechanisms, and it is the functioning of the 
system as a whole that may ultimately be responsible for organizational success and long-
term survival. 
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1.2 Functions of governance 
In mainstream research, corporate governance is primarily ascribed the function of 
controlling conflicts of interest between corporate management and other stakeholders, in 
particular shareholders (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Agency theory is typically used 
in governance research and dates back to the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). It shows 
how managers that own none or only little of the firm have a natural economic incentive to 
use information asymmetry to personally enrich themselves at the expense of other 
stakeholders. This leads to a reduction in the value of the company. Governance mechanisms 
are installed to reduce this loss and maintain the economic balance between stakeholders 
without disrupting the organization. From this point of view, governance essentially has a 
control function: reducing information asymmetry, sanctioning deviant behaviour, and 
creating incentives to align interests. Corporate governance can thus be seen as a “lever” for 
disciplining corporate top management. It is for this reason that, particularly following 
various financial scandals, codes of best practice on governance propose detailed and regular 
information for the board of directors and the recruitment of a majority of independent board 
members. 
In reality, however, the governance mechanisms of various organizations not only play a 
disciplinary role but also support their leadership cognitively in strategic decision-making. 
For example, the board not only provides discipline but also enhances competence (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999). This, of course, depends on the specific circumstances and the 
experience, competence, and knowledge of the specific board members. This cognitive 
function of governance is sometimes particularly pronounced in technology-intensive start-up 
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companies (Wirtz, 2011). The cognitive approaches of governance research find their 
theoretical roots in theories that are applied especially in strategic management, such as the 
resource-based view (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). 
More recently, various approaches have also found their way from behavioural economics 
(Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974) into governance research. 
These show that governance mechanisms can help to overcome psychological biases in 
addition to providing discipline and cognitive support. 
 
The various functions of governance each has a potential impact on an organization's 
performance and lifespan, and each has been researched to differing degrees. However, the 
results available to date suggest that one or another function is more or less pronounced 
depending on the specific type of organization and socio-economic environment. Financial 
discipline is typically foregrounded in large listed companies, while cognitive leverage is 
more salient in young innovative growth companies (Wirtz, 2011). Charreaux (2008) 
summarizes the various functions of a governance system in a metamodel that appears broad 
enough to apply to a wide variety of organizational types. The following sketch presents its 
transfer to Catholic religious orders. 
It can thus enable examination of which functions and levers are most emphasized in which 
Catholic religious communities, and whether they have played an essential role in the 
performance and long-term cohesion of these organizations. 
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FIGURE 2 
Charreaux’s metamodel applied to Catholic orders. Source: Wirtz (2017) 
 
 
1.3 The metamodel of governance and the need for contextualization 
Charreaux (2008) proposes a metamodel for understanding the functions of governance that 
integrates the disciplinary, cognitive, and psychological theoretical approaches to explain the 
levers that may influence top management. The managers, be they CEOs of public limited 
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companies or abbots of Benedictine abbeys, make decisions under the influence of these 
levers. If the disciplinary lever is particularly strong in an organization, this means that the 
freedom of the manager to pursue his or her own interests is severely restricted, for instance 
through strong independent control by a well-informed supervisory board or through controls 
as part of the visitation of an abbey. In theory, this should maintain a balance of interests in 
strategic decisions, which should positively influence the organization’s performance and 
long-term chances of survival. Depending on the outcome, the experience gained in this 
decision-making process may affect the further development and functioning of the 
governance system through positive feedback. If discipline is found to be too weak, for 
example after the discovery of financial scandals, the actors try to strengthen discipline. One 
example is the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation following the Enron scandal. 
If the cognitive lever is particularly strong, the governance system’s actors support the 
strategic decision-making processes of the leader with their competence and knowledge 
and/or contribute to reducing possible cognitive differences to overcome conflicts based on 
misunderstandings. Cognitive conflicts resulting from mutual incomprehension between 
organizational management and other stakeholders differ from objective conflicts of interest 
and can only be overcome through mutual learning and consequent cognitive rapprochement. 
Cognitive conflicts are thus overcome in quite a different way from agency conflicts. The 
learning processes triggered by a cognitive lever can also lead to the dynamic development of 
the governance system. 
Charreaux (2008) also distinguishes a third lever, the psychological, which can be explained 
by behavioural economics (for simplicity, this does not appear in Fig. 2). If this psychological 
lever is active, the corresponding governance mechanisms correct certain psychological 
weaknesses or cognitive distortions in the leadership’s decision-making and thus favour 
rationally based decisions. Typical examples of cognitive bias in clinical psychology and 
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behavioural economics include selective attention, over-generalization of certain facts, and 
overconfidence. When the psychological lever is applied, governance provides psychological 
support for decision-making. 
Charreaux’s metamodel is very general and therefore potentially suitable for application to 
very different types of organizations. It does not apply solely to a specific governance system, 
such as that typical of large listed corporations, as is often the case in mainstream governance 
research, so it leaves open the question of the concrete design of governance. It simply states 
that every organization has a governance system that consists of various more or less specific, 
intentional or spontaneous mechanisms that act as levers of a disciplinary, cognitive, or 
psychological nature on the room for manoeuvre of the organization's top management and 
thus have a significant influence on its performance and long-term cohesion. How this 
influence actually works in a particular organization over time is an empirical question. A 
comparative study of old Catholic orders is particularly helpful in advancing research into the 
effect of governance systems on organizational performance and longevity. Their life spans 
extend over centuries; some of these orders possess rich archive material, which allows their 
organizational processes to be partly reconstructed far back in time; and the orders have 
completely different governance systems, which partly stem from the organizational 
innovations of their founders. This last aspect may enrich the current debate on corporate 
governance, as it shows that and how innovative governance models can contribute to long-
term organizational success. This also means that the “One Best Way” of governance for 
long-term survival sometimes suggested in codes of best practice is illusory. 
Although formulated on the basis of modern economic theories, the metamodel’s very broad 
categories enable structured analyses of orders over long periods of time and render such 
analyses readily comparable. However, the metamodel must first be contextualized for each 
order and adapted to its specific conditions. Of course, it makes no sense to impose terms 
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used in mainstream corporate governance research on the order. This is true even of the title 
of the organization’s leader. One can scarcely use terms such as “CEO” or “chairman of the 
board” for orders, as in the standard literature on corporate governance. Instead, the specific 
term for the superior of each order should be used, especially since this usually says 
something about the exercise of authority in that order. The head of a Benedictine abbey is 
the abbot; the leader of a Dominican province is the provincial (in a convent: the prior); and 
in the strongly centralistic Jesuit order, it is the superior general. This is important because 
the title already signals something about its holder’s freedom of action and its limitation by 
various governance mechanisms. It is of course also futile to seek in the orders the 
mechanisms that usually exist in the corporate governance of public limited companies 
(supervisory board, owners’ meeting, etc.). Catholic orders have no shareholders, and the 
concept of property does not have the same meaning in a medieval context as it does in a 
modern liberal democracy. Nevertheless, all these orders have specific mechanisms that 
influence the freedom of action of the superiors and are thus part of their specific governance 
systems. To investigate the governance of the various orders, these mechanisms must first be 
described. Charreaux’s typology (1997) provides a very helpful structured approach. Typical 
examples of individual mechanisms of governance in orders include the chapters (specific 
and intentional), the rule of the order (not specific and intentional), the constitutions (not 
specific and intentional), the canon law (not specific and intentional), and the specific 
spirituality of an order (specific and spontaneous). These mechanisms do not all have the 
same weight at all times in every order. Once the mechanisms of governance for each order 
have been recorded, it is possible to reconstruct their mode of action and specific functions 
over long periods of time by archive research. This is an interdisciplinary undertaking, 
because it requires specific historical competencies. So far, very few papers have appeared on 
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this subject in current research, a point which will be discussed in more detail in the 
following. 
 
2. Benedict, Dominik, Ignatius: the origins of three different models of governance of 
catholic religious life 
Various prior essays (Wirtz, 2015; 2017) have used Charreaux's typology to classify the 
governance mechanisms of three emblematic Catholic orders: Benedictines, Dominicans, and 
Jesuits¬. Each originated in a different epoch, and all still exist today. The typology enables 
analysis of the mutual relations of the mechanisms within the system of governance they 
form. The main results are briefly summarized below. The developments of Benedictines and 
Dominicans can be found in Wirtz (2017), those of the Jesuits in Wirtz (2015). 
 
2.1 Benedictines 
One of the oldest monastic mechanisms of governance is the Rule of Benedict, written in the 
6th century in the Abbey of Montecassino. Charlemagne made it compulsory for all 
monasteries in the Carolingian Empire, and it exerted considerable influence on the 
development of medieval monasticism over the centuries. It is not only a rule of life for every 
single monk but also a governance mechanism in the sense of Charreaux’s definition (1997). 
Thus, for example, the Regula Benedicti (RB) specifies both the conditions for the election of 
the abbot and his expected behaviour (Chapters 2 and 64, RB). Thus, the rule contributes 
quite concretely and explicitly to the determination of the scope of action of the superiors of 
all Benedictine abbeys. From the point of view of the individual abbey, the RB is therefore a 
non-specific governance mechanism. In addition, it is an intentional mechanism, intended by 
Benedict and explicitly documented with often detailed statements about desired behaviours. 
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According to Inauen et al. (2010, 2012), in addition to the written rule, the Benedictine 
system of governance is based on three essential pillars: (1.) All monks, including the abbot, 
are committed to a common value system. This value system has been transferred through 
long dynamic socialization processes and can thus be classified as a spontaneous mechanism. 
The concrete manifestation of this value system is not static and can contain local or 
congregational specifics, as various reform movements have shown within the Benedictine 
order’s history (Marceau, 2018). Thus, the value system of each abbey contains both specific 
and non-specific elements. (2.) The chapter of an abbey is a specific and intentional 
governance mechanism through which the monks explicitly express themselves on essential 
topics. This is important because, when entering the Order, Benedictines commit themselves 
in principle to a life in a monastery (stabilitas loci). This right to speech, or voice, is 
particularly important for governance, because the alternative of exit, which plays an 
important role in the governance of listed companies, is not, or only to a limited extent, 
available to Benedictine monks. (3.) Canonical visitation, in which an external “auditor” 
commissioned by higher authorities visits the monastery, is a third essential pillar of 
Benedictine governance. It is a non-specific intentional mechanism. 
In addition to the rule and the three pillars of Benedictine governance, particular general and 
thus non-specific ecclesiastical mechanisms, such as canon law, are of course relevant to all 
orders. 
 
2.2 Dominicans 
At the beginning of the 13th century, the mendicant orders were created. These had a very 
different organizational and governance model from the Benedictines: While the Benedictine 
abbeys were essentially settled in rural areas and oriented towards a life of prayer and work, 
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mainly in the agriculture that guaranteed the monasteries’ subsistence, the mendicants arose 
in the cities that flourished in the High Middle Ages with a very clear orientation towards 
apostolic work without income from their own land. Thus, Dominic founded the Order of 
Preachers (OP), widely known as the Dominican Order, to preach the Word of God with 
conviction in what was then a modern urban society. Very early on, the Dominicans turned to 
the intellectual elites of their time and played an important role in the emergence of the young 
universities. The combination of faith and knowledge is particularly important for 
Dominicans, and the Order has produced great theologians over time, such as Albertus 
Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. 
Dominican convents differ substantially from Benedictine abbeys, since the Dominicans as 
preachers have no stabilitas loci. They travel often and usually change convent several times 
during their religious lives. Thus, Dominican friars are not sons of a particular monastery but 
sons of a religious province, and the provincial has the power to transfer them from one 
monastery to another as needed. What particularly distinguishes Dominican governance is a 
high degree of democratic decision-making at all levels of the Order. The Constitutions are 
the essential central regulation of the governance of the Order of Preachers, which does not 
have a specific rule but is oriented on the Augustine Rule. The Constitutions date back to the 
founding period, even though the entire body of work has developed over time into a regular 
legislative process. The superiors of the Dominican organization are located at three levels. 
Each convent has a prior, who is elected for three years and can only be re-elected once. He is 
elected by the convent chapter and is not necessarily a member of the same convent. The 
provincial is elected by the provincial chapter for a period of four years. The Master of the 
Order is elected by the General Chapter every nine years. In addition, a General Chapter is 
held every three years, and it is this General Chapter that acts as the legislature, with the 
approval of three successive Chapters to amend the Constitutions. It should also be noted that 
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the General Chapters function as a two-chamber system: alternately (1) the priors or (2) a 
selection of ordinary friars (called Definitors) come together in the General Chapter. Overall, 
the Dominicans spend a considerable amount of time discussing chapters at different levels. 
The bearers of authority change regularly, and the authority of a convent prior is quite limited 
compared to that of a Benedictine abbot. The Dominican system of governance for a single 
province, which determines the freedom of action of the provincial, is represented according 
to Charreaux's typology in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3:  
The governance system of a Dominican province categorized according to Charreaux (1997). 
Source: Wirtz (2017) 
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2.3 Jesuits 
The Jesuit Order was founded in the early modern age, in a world which had extended its 
geographical and intellectual boundaries considerably with modern seafaring and the 
discovery of America. The foundation date of the order is usually estimated to be 1534. This 
is the year in which Ignatius of Loyola and his first companions took a vow in Montmartre. In 
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1540, the Order received official ecclesiastical recognition with the decree of the papal bull 
Regimini Militantis Ecclesiae by Pope Paul III. This bull officially instituted the Formula 
Instituti. It had been created the previous year as a result of consultation with the founders of 
the Order to outline the structures of the Order, and it contains all the essential elements of 
the later Constitutions. The Constitutions were actually only written in detail a few years later 
and were less the result of theoretical considerations about optimal organization than the 
result of empirical experience with the religious life actually lived in the first years. In 
addition to the Constitutions, the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius are an essential component of 
Jesuit spirituality and thus also a firm component of the governance of the Order. The 
Spiritual Exercises of course also substantially influence the scope of action of the Superior 
General of the Order. What particularly distinguishes the governance of the Jesuits is the 
tension between very strong obedience to the Pope (the Jesuits vow unconditional obedience 
to the Pope) and a great measure of inner freedom, which favours the individual approach to 
the mysteries of faith and always endeavours to recognize their significance for specific 
contemporary problems in the most diverse situations, and thus to adapt the solutions to the 
particular circumstances. The Order is strongly hierarchically organized, and the authority of 
the Superior General is great, which is why he is sometimes called the “Black Pope”. In this 
respect, the Jesuits differ from the Dominicans, with whom they share a mainly missionary 
orientation. The Jesuits operated worldwide very early and adapted themselves locally to the 
specific institutional and cultural conditions. Competition among the orders can also be 
evaluated as a governance mechanism, since this competition can influence the strategic 
scope of action of the Superior General considerably. One instance of this was the papal 
prohibition of the Chinese rite, which was introduced by the Jesuits as an effective 
missionary technique in China and whose prohibition from the Church was actively pursued 
by the Dominicans, who proselytized in a more traditional way. 
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FIGURE 4 
The governance system of the Societas Jesu. Source: Wirtz 2015 
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The Constitutions of the Jesuits also provide for the General Congregation. This is the only 
truly democratic element of Jesuit governance. It meets only rarely: in 2016, the 36th General 
Congregation took place in the 470-year history of the Order. Its purpose is to elect the 
Superior General, which in principle takes place for life (although nowadays resignation is 
also possible due to age) and to address important strategic problems of the Order. This 
distinguishes the Jesuits very strongly from the Dominicans, who regularly spend a great deal 
of time discussing matters in various chapters. 
 
3. Levers for sustainable performance 
Now that the three governance systems have been broadly outlined, the question arises 
whether research provides any broad indications of their contribution to the long-term 
performance of the orders and how this might have been achieved. Has the disciplinary lever, 
the cognitive, the psychological, or a combination supported long-term performance and thus 
longevity across these religious organizations and epochs? Since no systematic study has 
addressed this issue to date, the aim here is to examine the literature for indications of the 
various levers. The first question to be clarified is what performance actually means for a 
Catholic order. 
 
3.1 What does performance mean in an order? 
The standard literature on corporate governance takes the central performance yardstick to be 
the long-term increase of shareholder value. This makes no sense for religious organizations 
such as the Catholic orders. The orders have no shareholders or owners, nor are their goals 
primarily oriented towards economic and financial achievements, even if these do play a role, 
especially with the Benedictines. Since the goals of the orders and their stakeholders have 
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specific characteristics, the definition and appraisal of the performance of, say, an abbey or a 
Dominican province is potentially complex. 
To our best knowledge, the first systematic study of the concept of performance in 
Benedictine abbeys is that by Payer-Langthaler and Hiebl (2013). These authors provide an 
etymological discussion of the concept of performance before proposing to measure a 
monastery’s performance by the specific objectives of the Order. These objectives are 
anchored in the Regula Benedicti, and the interpretation of the RB form the basis of the 
multidimensional performance concept of a Benedictine abbey developed by Payer-
Langthaler and Hiebl (2013). 
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FIGURE 5 
Multidimensional definition of the performance of Benedictine abbeys. Source: Payer-
Langthaler and Hiebl (2013, p. 224) 
 
 
 
This attempt to define the performance of Benedictine monasteries indicates that such a 
definition is necessarily specific to the order and depends on the objectives enshrined in its 
founding texts. The three fundamental objectives of the Benedictines identified by Payer-
Langthaler and Hiebl (search for God, sustainability, satisfaction in the house of God) require 
two key actions each for their successful implementation in the sense of Benedictine 
spirituality. For example, to implement the central goal of the search for God among the 
Benedictines, (Figure 5: A) the balance between the three activities of the Order's motto 
(praying, working, studying) and (B) the testimony of faith are of great importance. In 
addition to the spiritual-religious dimension, the Benedictines' performance has a second very 
important economic dimension. This is expressed in their motto as “Laborare” and is 
mentioned in several places in the RB: the economy should serve sustainability and long-term 
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survival. This should be done (C) by careful handling and protection of assets and (D) by 
regular income in sufficient measure. These actions are also potentially an important basis for 
the satisfaction of the various stakeholders of Benedictine monasteries (E, F). 
To the best of our knowledge, no detailed studies similar to Payer-Langthaler and Hiebl’s 
(2013) have been conducted on the other orders, but one can at least attempt to identify an 
order’s basic objectives from its motto. For example, the Jesuits clearly focus on mission 
under the motto “Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam”, and Wirtz (2015) proposes to measure the 
organizational performance of the Societas Jesu by their missionary successes. 
The Dominicans’ chief work is as preachers in the present society, and the order’s motto also 
expresses this ("Laudare, Benedicere, Praedicare"). This work is based on intensive study and 
intellectual and spiritual activity. These are explicitly mentioned in the Constitutions, and the 
prior has some freedom of action for their concrete implementation. For example, the 
Constitutions allow dispensation from various regular religious activities for the purpose of 
study. 
3.2 Previous research on the functions of governance in Catholic orders 
Charreaux’s (2008) metamodel shows how an organization's governance system may 
influence long-term performance and survival through three levers. Business research on the 
governance of the Catholic orders in their long history suggests that this explanatory scheme 
is plausible. Previous research on particular orders has concentrated on specific functions or 
levers, such as discipline, which apparently played an important role in performance and 
survival across sometimes very significant periods of time. This suggests that not all levers 
are used to the same extent in all orders at all times. The following overview shows that the 
disciplinary lever seems to have played a special role with the Benedictines, the cognitive 
lever with the Dominicans and the cognitive and psychological levers with the Jesuits. 
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However, caution is needed when interpreting these results, because they only reflect the 
current state of research. Evidence for the existence of the three functions is so far too 
incompletely documented, and only in-depth systematic historical studies can provide more 
certainty. However, the research results to date show that this path is very promising. 
The works of Inauen et al. (2010, 2012) and Feldbauer-Durstmüller et al. (2013) are among 
the first to investigate the governance of Benedictine abbeys over long periods of time. 
Inauen et al (2010) explain that the Benedictine abbeys' economic activity could lead to 
strong incentives and temptations for the abbot, and these could lead to a considerable 
potential for agency costs. Dobie (2015) documents concrete cases of agency conflicts in 
English Benedictine abbeys between the 13th and 15th centuries. 
 
“The first Chapters […] noted that prelates were said to be known for their 
extravagance, and sought to limit abbatial expenses by restricting the number and 
apparel of their servants to a respectable standard […]. In 1287, the priors of York, 
Whitby and Selby were ordered not to have their own chambers, chaplains, horses 
or attendants beyond those of the sub-prior of Durham […]. These concerns over 
extravagance were still a concern in 1421 when the proposed articles of Henry V 
criticised the “scandalous equipage” of abbots’ riding parties.” (Dobie, 2015, p. 
148) 
 
Dobie uses specific cases to show how mechanisms of governance, in particular visitations 
and chapters, contributed to resolving agency conflicts. The resolution of these conflicts was 
of central importance for the survival of these abbeys. Inauen et al (2010) examine the 
chronicles of the almost 900-year history of Engelberg Abbey. They identify the abbots who 
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were known for pursuing their own interests and show that the abbey's system of governance 
had the effect of removing these abbots, usually after a short time. This may have contributed 
significantly to the abbey's survival potential. 
 
Wirtz (2017) shows that the cognitive lever of governance plays a very special role for the 
Dominicans. This order is concerned with spreading the Word of God effectively, so the 
superiors’ essential strategic decision-making challenge is to recognize how this is best done. 
This essentially concerns knowledge and ideas. Wirtz analyses a historical example, based on 
a historical study by Raison du Cleuziou (2015), which shows how the governance of the 
French Dominican Province resolved a cognitive conflict between the provincial and 
opposition brothers of the province, thus ensuring the cohesion of the province. The conflict 
did not concern objective economic interests but was about differing interpretations of the 
best way to a common goal pursued by all. However, other examples in the history of the 
Dominicans document individual friars’ conflicts of interest (Hasquenoph, 1994), so the 
occasional existence of agency costs cannot be completely ruled out, even if the incentive for 
this is smaller, because the economic component of their work is weaker than the 
Benedictines’. 
Wirtz (2015) uses an in-depth study of the history of the Societas Jesu and their constitutions 
(Bertrand, 1974) to examine exactly how governance significantly influenced mission 
success in the early history of the Jesuits. Two instances are salient in this respect. The 
unconditional vow of obedience to the Pope in the early years of the Jesuits helped to solve a 
dilemma about the specific destinations for missionary work. The Order simply let the Pope 
decide and went to the countries that he prescribed without investing much time in reflection. 
This governance mechanism thus acted as a psychological lever. Furthermore, the specific 
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Jesuit spirituality made it possible to adapt effectively to the concrete circumstances on the 
spot; the Chinese rite, though later forbidden, is an example of this. 
 
FIGURE 6  
Influence of Jesuit governance on missionary success. Source: Wirtz (2015) 
 
 
The guidelines and activities for evaluating performance, the main pillars of the governance 
systems, and the functions they perform for the three orders are compared below. 
FIGURE 7 
Comparison of the governance systems of the Benedictines, Dominicans, and Jesuits. 
 Benedictines Dominicans Jesuits 
Motto Ora et Labora et Lege 
(pray, work, and study) 
Laudare Benedicere 
Praedicare (praise, 
bless, and preach) 
Ad Majorem Dei 
Gloriam (for the 
greater glory of God) 
important 
activities  
- spiritual 
- economic  
- spiritual 
- preaching 
- Missionary 
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key 
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and autonomous 
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their specifics) 
- - consilium 
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- Visitations 
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of the Order and 
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(evolving) 
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province, order) 
on a regular 
basis. 
- Regular renewal 
of all offices 
- Mobility within 
a province 
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Ignatius 
(Spiritual 
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cialization 
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- Vow of 
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the Pope and 
the Superior 
General) 
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Congregation 
(irregular and 
rare) 
Conflicts 
investigated in 
Agency conflict 
(objective economic 
conflict of interest) 
Conflict over the 
interpretation of the best 
Uncertainty of 
mission direction in a 
complex open world 
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business 
studies 
possible way to carry 
out preaching activity 
Main lever 
investigated 
discipline 
(cognitive lever appears 
as secondary) 
cognitive 
(disciplinary lever 
appears as secondary) 
Psychological 
(obedience) and 
cognitive (spiritual 
exercises) 
 
 
4. Discussion 
This brief inventory of the current state of research on the form and functions of the 
governance of three old Catholic orders in historical perspective has, first and foremost, 
demonstrated that no uniform system of governance exists. Instead, diverse systems have 
each contributed to the long-term ability to survive. The Benedictines, Dominicans, and 
Jesuits’ corporate governance differ very strongly. This gives every reason to question the 
myth often spread in the current debate on corporate governance and codes of best practice 
that there is such a thing as a single optimal model. This applies both to the form of the 
governance system (what mechanisms does it actually consist of, and how do they interact?) 
and to the functions of the systems for performance (are these primarily disciplinary, 
cognitive, and/or psychological in nature?). The three long-lived orders examined here each 
developed its own unique model of organization and governance during its founding period; 
each has evolved over time, but the essential core of each remains today. 
Despite all the differences, one common feature is salient: the vital importance of 
institutionalized socialization to the central values and specific spirituality of each order. 
While the socialization process presupposes complex social interactions in a shared religious 
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life, each order has also created an institutional framework for the socialization and 
internalization of its values (rules, constitutions, retreats). The potential significance of 
socialization through what has been termed clan control (Ouchi, 1980) is well known in 
economic research, but this is almost completely neglected in the current discussion on 
corporate governance. The debate on best practice in corporate governance is mostly focused 
on mechanisms of extrinsic motivation and control, while socialization is conducive to the 
intrinsic motivation of all members of an order and thus also of its superior. Intrinsic 
motivation can be assumed to have made a significant contribution to the centuries-long 
cohesion of the three orders examined here. 
Studying the governance of ancient Catholic orders can provide inspiration for other types of 
organizations. This is especially true for value-oriented organizations without profit motives, 
such as NGOs, associations, and cooperatives. But even for traditional companies, several 
aspects may give food for thought. Of course, simple wholesale transfer should be avoided; 
this study has also underlined the significance of specific socio-economic circumstances. But 
including the governance practiced in these orders over centuries enriches the discussion of 
solutions to current problems and may provide a source of innovative contributions. 
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